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OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS- 
REFLECTIONS ON BLISSET v DANIEL 
 




The leading modern case on the law relating to the rights of minority 
shareholders is the decision of the House of Lords in O’Neill v Phillips,1 in 
which Lord Hoffmann, giving the only speech, appeared to place heavy 
reliance upon the seminal speech of Lord Wilberforce in Re Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd.2   The main purpose of this article is to compare and contrast 
the reasoning of Lord Hoffmann with that of Lord Wilberforce.  It is proposed 
to begin with a close look at the old case of Blisset v Daniel,3 and to analyse 
the use to which that authority was put by Lord Hoffmann and Lord 
Wilberforce.  It is proposed to conclude by considering the question whether 
the reasoning of Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips is, or was indeed ever 
meant by him to be, of general or wide application.4  
 
BLISSET v DANIEL 
 
Blisset v Daniel,5 like its better known elder sibling Foss v Harbottle,6 has 
had a remarkable influence on modern company law.   
It was an action before the then Vice-Chancellor (nowadays called “the 
Chancellor” in anticipation of the abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor), 
Sir W Page Wood, in the old Court of Chancery, whose workings were 
colourfully described in Charles Dickens’ novel “Bleak House”.  It concerned 
the affairs of a partnership business of melting and making copper, brass and 
mixed metals at Bristol, Swansea and elsewhere.  The partnership deed 
contained a clause empowering the holders of at least two-thirds of the 
∗ Robin Hollington QC is visiting professor of law at the University of Buckingham 
and a barrister at Lincoln’s Inn. 
1 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
2 Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360. 
3 Blisset v Daniel (1853) 10 Hare 493. 
4 It is a mystery why O’Neill v Phillips has not been reported in the Appeal Cases 
reports – perhaps this is some indication of its status as a decision on its facts! 
5 See n 3 above. 
6 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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partnership shares to expel a partner without cause and to purchase his shares 
at a value stipulated in the deed (which excluded any account of future 
profits).  A two-thirds majority purported to expel a long-established partner.  
The long and short of it was that the Vice-Chancellor (with the greatest 
reluctance and finding it hard to believe that “gentlemen” could act with such 
harshness) concluded that the majority had no reason for his expulsion other 
than the desire to purchase his share at a favourable price.  He therefore set 
aside the expulsion. 
Blisset v Daniel7 has had something of a chequered history, having been 
on occasions interpreted narrowly and distinguished.8 It was, however, whole-
heartedly embraced by Lord Wilberforce in Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd,9 the 
well-known case on the scope of the just and equitable winding up remedy of 
the Insolvency Act 1986.10  It then was taken up by Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill 
v Phillips,11 the modern leading case on both the unfair prejudice (the 
Companies Act 1985)12 and the just and equitable winding up remedies, and 
was relied upon by him as an integral part of his analysis of the scope of those 
remedies. 
There are significant differences in the analyses of Lord Wilberforce and 
Lord Hoffmann respectively, and in their respective uses of Blisset v Daniel, 
13and neither may be wholly satisfactory or provide a complete set of 
principles applicable to all cases.   
The factual context common to all three cases, and typical to disputes 
between majorities and minorities in companies, is the exclusion of the 
minority by the majority from participation in the management and profits of 
the company.  Exclusion can cover a multitude of circumstances, ranging 
from the clear case where a minority shareholder is removed as a director and 
sacked as an employee, to the less clear case where a minority shareholder 
leaves claiming to have been forced out, to the remote case where a minority 
shareholder with no management participation complains about the non-
payment of dividends coupled with the payment of excessive remuneration to 
the controlling shareholders.     
7 See n 3 above. 
8 See Russell v Russell (1880) 14 Ch D 471; Albert Phillips v Manufacturers 
Securities Ltd [1917] 116 LT 290, 297, where Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. stressed the 
freedom of a shareholder to exercise his rights selfishly and even maliciously. 
9 Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL). 
10 Section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
11 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL). 
12 Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 now Section 994 of the Companies Act 
2006. 
13 See n 3 above. 
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First it is desirable to make some general remarks about the rights of 
minority shareholders.  
 
PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
 
Two cardinal principles of judge-made English company law are that in 
general the will of the majority shareholders binds the minority and 
shareholders are entitled to exercise their rights as shareholders in their own 
selfish interests.  This reflects the fact that most companies are the vehicles 
for a purely commercial relationship between the joint venturers, who as 
businessmen expect their relationship to be governed essentially by the terms 
they have agreed between themselves as governing their association.  There 
is, of course, no general duty of good faith as between contracting parties 
under English law of contract.  The famous leading case on the above two 
cardinal principles is the decision of the Privy Council in North-West 
Transportation v Beatty.14  In that case the majority shareholder proposed to 
sell a ship to the company, a transaction which on its face raised a conflict of 
interest, and he procured the passing of a shareholders’ resolution authorising 
this purchase against the votes of all independent shareholders.  It was held 
that the minority shareholders had no ground for complaint on the facts of the 
case, there being no allegation of actual impropriety beyond the existence of a 
conflict of interest. 
Minority shareholders enjoy some protection against the tyranny of the 
majority under two statutory provisions:  
(i) section 459 of the Companies Act 1985, re-enacted as 
section 994 of the Companies Act 2006, on the ground 
that the affairs of the company have been conducted in an 
“unfairly prejudicial” manner; 
 
(ii) section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986, on the 
ground that it is “just and equitable” that the company 
should be wound up 
 
In each case, the principal remedy that the statute provides is a realisation 
of the minority shareholder’s interest in the company, in other words a 
divorce from the majority and a termination of their relationship through the 
vehicle of the company.  
14 North-West Transportation v Beatty [1887] 12 App Cas 589. Under section 239 of 
the Companies Act 2006 wrongdoing directors can no longer ratify as shareholders 
their own breaches of duty. 
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The winding-up remedy has been part of the Companies Acts since 1862.  
The unfair prejudice remedy is of more recent origin and its principal purpose 
(even in its original form as section 210 of the Companies Act 1948) has 
always been to provide an alternative and less drastic remedy to the blunt 
instrument of winding up. It is now well established, and this is not doubted 
given its obvious sense as part of a rational and coherent set of legal 
principles, that, in general,15 the principles underlying the two remedies are 
essentially the same and the winding-up remedy is no wider than the unfair 
prejudice remedy: see O’Neill v Phillips:16 and Re Guidezone Ltd.17  Given 
that winding-up is a drastic remedy and that the court has much wider powers 
under section 459 (ie, to order one side to buy out the other at a fair value), 
the unfair prejudice remedy is nowadays by far the most important remedy 
available to a minority shareholder. 
To put the above statutory remedies into context, a minority shareholder 
has other sources of protection independent of those statutory remedies.  
These remedies are as follows: 
 
(i) The protection afforded by the articles of association and 
any shareholders’ agreement.   
 
(ii) The protection afforded by equity under its doctrine of 
“fraud on a minority”, including the right to bring 
derivative proceedings under what are called the 
“exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle”.18 
 
Unless a minority shareholder has specifically bargained for a right to 
realise his investment in the company (as professional investors will often do), 
none of these non-statutory remedies enables a court to order the realisation of 
his investment.  
FRAUD ON MINORITY 
 
The scope of the equitable doctrine on “fraud on a minority” is 
controversial and, so far as decided cases are concerned, very limited.  
15 There is an unresolved doubt as to whether the aggrieved minority shareholder, in 
order to obtain the winding-up remedy, needs to show that he has been prejudiced in 
his capacity as a member for the purposes of the winding-up remedy or that the 
misconduct complained of is conduct of the affairs of the company: see per Lord 
Wilberforce in Re Westbourne Galleries [1973] AC 360 at p 375A-B. 
16 See n 1 above. 
17 Re Guidezone Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 321. 
18 See n 6 above. 
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Shareholders do not in general owe any fiduciary duties to the company or 
their co-shareholders – shares are property rights which can be exercised for 
the selfish ends of their owners.  But there are exceptional occasions when 
equity will intervene.  The classic example is the right of a minority 
shareholder, by way of an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle,19 to bring 
a derivative action for the company’s benefit where the majority derive 
benefits from the company in colourable circumstances and stifle any claim to 
recover those benefits.  The modern leading case on the scope of this 
exception is Prudential v Newman Industries.20   Derivative actions are now 
to be put on a statutory footing under the Companies Act 2006.  This will give 
the courts the opportunity to widen the availability of derivative actions: 
whether the courts will take up this opportunity is open to doubt.  
The doctrine also encompasses the principle that, where passing special 
resolutions to alter the articles, the majority must act “bona fide for the benefit 
of the company as a whole”: per Lindley M.R. in Allen v Gold Reefs of West 
Africa Ltd.21  The notorious example of the weakness of this principle is 
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas,22 where the court refused to strike down a 
special resolution designed to confer an advantage on the majority by freeing 
them from the application of pre-emption provisions.  The principle has been 
applied in cases where the majority have sought to expropriate the minority 
improperly: Dafen Tinplate Co Ltd v Llanelly Steel Co.23   
There is, however, some controversial support for an argument that the 
principle is of wider application, is not confined to the case of alteration of the 
articles and is based on general equitable principles derived from the law of 
partnership: Clemens v Clemens.24  In that case Foster J, citing Re Westbourne 
Galleries,25 struck down a proposed allotment of shares authorised by 
ordinary resolution of the members, on the ground that the majority’s purpose 
was not to raise capital but to dilute the interest of the minority.  Furthermore, 
in the well-known judgment of Dixon J in Peters American Delicacy Co Ltd v 
Heath,26 he drew an analogy between the exercise by a shareholder of its 
voting rights and the exercise by a mortgagee of its powers of sale,27 although 
the conventional view is that equity will only draw such an analogy in special 
19 See n 6 above. 
20 Prudential v Newman Industries (No. 2) [1982] Ch 204. 
21 Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656, 671. 
22 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas [1951] Ch 286. 
23 Dafen Tinplate Co Ltd v Llanelly Steel Co [1920] Ch 124. 
24 Clemens v Clemens [1976] 2 All ER 268. 
25 See n 2 above. 
26 Peters American Delicacy Co Ltd v Heath [1938-1939] 61 CLR 457. 
27 Ibid at 504. 
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cases, such as expropriation of the minority.  He explained Lord Lindley’s test 
of “bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole” in the following way: 
 
“The chief reason for denying an unlimited effect to widely 
expressed powers such as that of altering a company’s 
articles is the fear or knowledge that an apparently regular 
exercise of the power may in truth be but a means of securing 
some personal or particular gain, whether pecuniary or 
otherwise, which does not fairly arise out of the subjects 
dealt with by the power and is outside and even inconsistent 
with the contemplated objects of the power.  It is to exclude 
the purpose of securing such ulterior and particular 
advantages that Lord Lindley used the phrase “bona fide 
for the benefit of the company as a whole”.  The reference 
to “benefit as a whole” is but a very general expression 
negativing purposes foreign to the company’s operations, 
affairs and organizations. …  [But no]one supposes that in 
voting each shareholder is to assume an inhuman altruism 
and consider only the tangible notion of the benefit of the 
vague abstraction called ‘the company as an institution’.  An 
investigation of the thoughts and motives of each shareholder 
voting with the majority would be an impossible proceeding.  
When the purpose of a resolution is spoken of, a phrase is 
used which refers rather to some characteristic implicit in the 
resolution in virtue of the circumstances or of some larger 
transaction of which it formed a part or step”28 
As will be seen below, this analysis of the basis of equitable intervention 
is remarkably similar to the analysis of Page Wood V-C in Blisset v Daniel.29 
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
 
In the case of “quasi-partnerships”, ie companies which are in substance 
partnerships, typically incorporated partnerships where the parties have not 
consciously agreed the terms of their new association in the guise of a 
company, the conventional wisdom is as follows: 
 
(a) A minority shareholder and quasi-partner will be granted relief 
under the statutory grounds if he is excluded from management 
28 Ibid at 511-513. 
29 See n 3 above. 
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by the majority, but that relief may be refused if the majority 
persuade the court that the dismissal of the minority was 
justified by his misconduct: Mears v Mears;30 Re Jayflex 
Construction Ltd;31 Woolwich v Milne.32 
 
(b) Absent exclusion of the minority from management, it is not 
sufficient merely that there has been a breakdown of the 
relationship of trust and confidence between the quasi-partners, 
unless of course the breakdown is caused by the wrongful 
conduct of the majority: O’Neill v Phillips;33 Re Guidezone 
Ltd;34 Larvin v Phoenix;35 Grace v Biagioli;36 Strahan v 
Wilcox.37 
 
The above conventional wisdom can be questioned.  The “hard” officious 
bystander, who favours the sanctity of contract in commercial relations, would 
question whether an excluded minority shareholder should obtain relief if the 
majority excluded him in good faith in the interests of the company’s 
business: such was the view of a strong Court of Appeal in the Westbourne 
Galleries case.38 “Quasi-partners” may start off with the expectation that each 
will be involved in the management, but circumstances change rapidly in 
business and how can it be said that it is outside the contemplation of the 
parties that circumstances may change which render it desirable that the 
majority exercise their power to remove the minority?  If the test, therefore, is 
that of the content of the parties’ understandings, it is difficult to infer the 
existence of any absolute agreement or understanding between them that, 
defeasible only by proof of demonstrable fault on one side, the majority will 
not remove the minority.  Furthermore, the minority shareholder had the 
opportunity of protecting himself by bargaining for protection in a 
shareholders’ agreement and the court should not assist him if he has not 
succeeded in doing so.  The “soft” officious bystander, on the other hand, 
would say that, in a company which was in substance a partnership without 
any specifically agreed partnership agreement, there should be a parting of 
ways, by winding up if necessary, if there had merely been an irretrievable 
30 Mears v Mears [2002] 2 BCLC 1. 
31 Re Jayflex Construction Ltd [2004] 2 BCLC 145. 
32 Woolwich v Milne [2003] EWHC 414 (Ch). 
33 See n 1 above. 
34 See n 17 above. 
35 Larvin v Phoenix [2003] 1 BCLC 76. 
36 Grace v Biagioli [2006] BCC 85. 
37 Strahan v Wilcox [2006] BCC 320. 
38[1991] Ch 799. 
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breakdown of relations, ie as if it were a partnership at will, particularly if this 
was the pre-existing relationship.  If this were the law, this would obviate the 
unsatisfactory situation (arising under the conventional wisdom) where quasi-
partners fall out but the majority dare not exclude the minority, even if it is in 
the interests of the business to do so, for fear of being forced to buy him out.  
It would also obviate the need for a minute and undesirable dissection of the 
reasons for the breakdown, although there would have to be an exception for 
the case where the minority has so seriously misconducted himself that it 
would not be just to grant him relief or at any rate that his shares should be 
valued with a full discount for a minority shareholding.  Arguments based on 
economic utility in support of the “hard” and “soft” points of view 
respectively would be fairly evenly balanced.   
There is much to be said for the conventional wisdom as a rough and 
ready and fair compromise, but is it based on sound principles? 
THE HOLY GRAIL OF A “MIDDLE WAY” 
In the 1990’s there was much discussion in the political arena of a “third” 
or “middle” “way” between the extremes of capitalism (the “right”) and 
socialism (the “left”).  At the same time, there was a debate in the courts as to 
the principles which applied in determining whether a minority shareholder 
should be granted relief under the statutory remedies.  Parliament had framed 
these remedies in very broad terms and in effect left the courts to work out the 
principles to be applied.  Instinctively in this context, the courts declined to 
dispense palm-tree justice according to the whim and pleasure of the 
individual judge (or according to “the length of the Chancellor’s foot”): not 
only does equity have an instinctive aversion to wide discretionary powers,39 
but also, in a commercial context, it was important that the law was as certain 
and predictable as possible: see per Warner J in Re JE Cade & Son Ltd,40 
cited by Lord Hoffmann with approval in O’Neill v Phillips.41  But it was also 
fairly clear from the legislative history at least of the unfair prejudice remedy, 
and acknowledged at an early stage, that, in enacting the statutory remedies, 
Parliament had not merely intended to give the courts a wider battery of 
remedies (eg the power to make a share purchase order) for cases which, apart 
from the new statutory remedies, were already established as wrongs to the 
39 See per Harman LJ in Re Caribbean Products (Yam Importers) Ltd [1966] Ch 331, 
346. 
40 Re JE Cade & Son Ltd [1992] BCLC 213, 227. 
41 See n 1 above. 
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minority: eg cases of “fraud on the minority” and breaches of personal rights 
as shareholders.42  
So the search was for a middle way between the extremes of palm-tree 
justice and the remedying of existing wrongs.  The courts flirted with the 
concept of a minority shareholder’s “legitimate expectations” as the 
foundation of his protection, a concept which was well-known in the public 
law context and derived some support from the speech of Lord Wilberforce in 
the Westbourne Galleries case:43 see eg per Hoffmann LJ in Re Saul D. 
Harrison & Sons plc.44  Lord Wilberforce had said: 
 
“The foundation of it all lies in the words "just and equitable" 
and, if there is any respect in which some of the cases may be 
open to criticism, it is that the courts may sometimes have 
been too timorous in giving them full force. The words are a 
recognition of the fact that a limited company is more than a 
mere legal entity, with a personality in law of its own: that 
there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that 
behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, 
expectations and obligations inter se which are not 
necessarily submerged in the company structure. That 
structure is defined by the Companies Act and by the articles 
of association by which shareholders agree to be bound. In 
most companies and in most contexts, this definition is 
sufficient and exhaustive, equally so whether the company is 
large or small. The "just and equitable" provision does not, as 
the respondents suggest, entitle one party to disregard the 
obligation he assumes by entering a company, nor the court 
to dispense him from it. It does, as equity always does, 
enable the court to subject the exercise of legal rights to 
equitable considerations; considerations, that is, of a personal 
character arising between one individual and another, which 
may make it unjust, or inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or 
to exercise them in a particular way.”45
 
42 See per Hoffmann J in Re A Company [1986] BCLC 382, 387-388, and Hoffmann 
LJ in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17-20. 
43 See n 2 above. 
44 Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 19. 
45 See n 2 above at 379. 
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O’NEILL v PHILLIPS – THE “BARGAIN” BETWEEN 
SHAREHOLDERS 
 
That search for the holy grail of a middle way apparently came to an end 
with Lord Hoffmann’s speech in the House of Lords in O’Neill v Phillips, 46 
where Lord Hoffmann enunciated what have since been understood to be 
principles of general application to all cases where a minority shareholder 
sought to rely upon the statutory remedies. He recanted on his use of the 
concept of “legitimate expectations” in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc 47 but 
otherwise adopted what he had said in that case.  He held that the courts 
should usually grant relief only in circumstances where there had been a 
breach of the terms on which the shareholders had agreed that the affairs of 
the company should be conducted (ie the articles of association and any 
shareholders’ agreement, together with general provisions of company law 
and statute), including (and this was new) any breach of fiduciary duty by the 
directors of the company without the restrictions of the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle.48  So, save to the extent that any breach of fiduciary duty by the 
directors was now a potential ground for relief (because it was treated as a 
breach of the terms of association, ie the “bargain” between the shareholders) 
and subject to the exception discussed below, Lord Hoffmann closed the door 
on a “middle way” and held that the petitioner had to show a breach of the 
terms of association, ie a wrong independent of the statutory remedies.   But 
he did not close the door completely and recognised an exception: he held that 
exceptionally it would be appropriate to grant relief by applying equitable 
principles of good faith typically to be found in the law of partnership.  
However, in order not to open the door too far, he emphasised that the only 
applicable equitable principles were ones that were already “established”, 
“traditional” and “reasonably settled”, not general notions of fairness nor ones 
based on “legitimate expectations”.  He explained what equitable principles 
he had in mind. 
In reaching his conclusions Lord Hoffmann relied upon the speech of 
Lord Wilberforce in the Westbourne Galleries case.49  Lord Hoffmann and 
Lord Wilberforce had each relied upon the same earlier lines of authority: 
first, the judgment of Page Wood V-C in Blisset v Daniel,50 which will be 
analysed in detail later (which, incidentally, was cited to Lord Wilberforce but 
not Lord Hoffmann); secondly, the judgment of Smith J in Re Wondoflex 
46 See n 1 above. 
47 See n 44 above. 
48 See [1999] 1 WLR at 1098D-1099B, and [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 18. This has 
subsequently become controversial: see Re Chime Corp Ltd [2004] 3 H K L R D 922. 
49 See n 2 above. 
50 See n 3 above. 
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Textiles Pty Ltd51 (which, incidentally, was cited to neither of them in 
argument).  In a passage cited with approval by both Lord Wilberforce in the 
Westbourne Galleries case52 and Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips,53 
Smith J had held: 
 
“It is also true, I think, that, generally speaking, a petition for 
winding up, based on the partnership analogy, cannot 
succeed if what is complained of is merely a valid exercise of 
powers conferred in terms by the articles: ……..To hold 
otherwise would enable a member to be relieved from the 
consequences of a bargain knowingly entered into by him: 
…….It would seem to follow that as a general rule a valid 
exercise of a power of exclusion conferred by the articles 
cannot afford a ground for winding up.  But this, I think, is 
subject to an important qualification.  Acts which, in law, 
are a valid exercise of powers conferred by the articles 
may nevertheless be entirely outside what can fairly be 
regarded as having been in the contemplation of the 
parties when they became members of the company; and 
in such cases the fact that what has been done is not in excess 
of power will not necessarily be an answer to a claim for 
winding up  Indeed, it may be said that one purpose of 
[the just and equitable winding up remedy] is to enable 
the Court to relieve a party from his bargain in such 
cases.”54
 
Lord Wilberforce expressed the same thought in these words: 
 
“A company, however small, however domestic, is a 
company not a partnership or even a quasi-partnership and it 
is through the just and equitable clause that obligations, 
common to partnership relations, may come in.”55  
 
So, it is clear that, notwithstanding the dicta of Foster J in Clemens v 
Clemens,56 the application of equitable partnership principles to companies 
was not something that equity managed on its own but was something that 
51 Re Wondoflex Textiles Pty Ltd [1951] VLR 458. 
52 See n 2 above. 
53 See n 1 above. 
54 See n 51 above at 467. 
55 See n 2 above at 380. 
56 See n 24 above. 
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only the statutory remedies enabled.  Given the existence of the statutory 
remedies, however, this issue of the scope of equity does not matter. 
In the light of the analysis of Smith J, approved by both Lord Wilberforce 
and Lord Hoffmann, the crucial question was: when was it appropriate to 
relieve a minority shareholder from the legal bargain he had made, ie the 
bargain to be found in the articles of association, any shareholders’ 
agreement, and the usual incidents of company law apart from the statutory 
remedies?   
Lord Hoffmann’s answer to that question in O’Neill v Phillips,57 leaving 
aside the case where breach of fiduciary duty by a director was in issue, was: 
it was only appropriate to relieve a minority shareholder from the bargain he 
had made where (1) it was appropriate to import equitable principles into the 
relationship and (2) the majority’s conduct was unconscionable under 
established equitable principles.  So far as (1) was concerned, the label 
attached to companies where it was appropriate to import equitable principles 
is a “quasi-partnership”.  So far as (2) was concerned, unconscionable 
behaviour in a “quasi-partnership” would “usually” be found in the breach of 
an agreement or understanding between the members (even if that was not a 
legally binding promise).58  Other examples of unconscionable behaviour 
given by Lord Hoffmann were the maintenance of the association in 
circumstances  where an event has occurred which puts an end to the basis of 
the association, and which the others can reasonably say they did not agree 
to.59
In summary, it is clear that Lord Hoffmann wanted the starting point of 
his analysis to be the “bargain” between the shareholders: in other words, a 
contract-based analysis.  He recognised, however, that in exceptional 
circumstances the court might enforce promises between the shareholders 
which were not legally binding, but only under settled equitable principles.  In 
most cases, that bargain would be found in what had actually been agreed in 
the articles of association and any shareholders’ agreement.  
Although the evident intention of Lord Hoffmann was to introduce as 
much certainty as possible to claims of unfair prejudice, thereby significantly 
narrowing its scope, his reasoning obviously needs to be understood in the 
light of the facts of the case before him in O’Neill v Phillips.60  As one would 
expect, he chose his words carefully:   
 
“ ..I think that one useful cross check in a case like this is to 
ask whether the exercise of the power in question would be 
57 See n 1 above. 
58 See n 1 above at 1101. 
59 See n 1 above at 1101-1102, cited at p 26 below. 
60 See n 1 above. 
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contrary to what the parties, by words or conduct, have 
actually agreed” (emphasis added),61  
 
ie it was only a cross-check, it was not the only cross-check, and in any 
event it was a cross-check that could usefully be applied on the facts of the 
case.  The facts were that the petitioner had initially become a shareholder not 
as a partner but as an employee: he was a labourer promoted to management.  
The agreement very casually reached at the time of his initial promotion was 
that, so long as the petitioner managed the business for the principal 
shareholder, he would receive 50% of the “profits”, which were never 
defined.  The business flourished and the profit-sharing arrangement operated, 
albeit imperfectly.  Circumstances changed, however, and the petitioner 
became in substance a working partner, because he agreed to the capitalisation 
of some of the profits rather than their distribution under the profit-sharing 
arrangement.  The good times then came to an end, the majority shareholder 
felt that he had to retake control of the company, and, having obtained the 
minority’s consent to this new arrangement, he stated that henceforth the 
profit-sharing arrangement was at an end in accordance with their original 
agreement.  The petitioner felt that he could not accept this sudden and 
unilateral termination of the profit-sharing arrangement, and he left the 
business.  The majority shareholder denied any obligation to buy his shares 
out at a fair value.   
Applying his “bargain” analysis, Lord Hoffmann held that there had been 
no breach of any promise made by the majority shareholder or of any other 
term of the association, because the profit-sharing agreement was expressly 
conditional upon his being relieved from running the business. The fact that 
the unilateral and peremptory withdrawal of the profit-sharing arrangement, 
which had been in operation for many years during which period the minority 
had agreed to the capitalisation of substantial profits, had serious financial 
consequences for the minority was not sufficient: such hardship did not 
suffice under traditional equitable principles because no unconditional 
promise had been made.62  Furthermore, so Lord Hoffmann held, although it 
was proper to apply equitable principles to their relationship, the majority had 
not excluded the minority shareholder, who had elected to leave because the 
majority had exercised his express right to withdraw the profit-sharing 
                                                     
61 See n 1 above at 1101F. 
62 It could be argued that Lord Hoffmann’s implicit conclusion, that the condition that 
the majority was relieved from running the business remained in force after such a 
long period and in such changed circumstances, was harsh; but commerce is not fair 
and His Honour Judge Paul Baker QC, the judge at first instance, made adverse 
comments in his judgment about the credibility of the Petitioner. 
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arrangement in the new circumstances which prevailed upon his return to the 
management of the company.   
 
 
THE WESTBOURNE GALLERIES CASE 
 
Westbourne Galleries63 was an exclusion case.  Partners in a partnership 
at will agreed to incorporate the business: upon its incorporation, the majority 
shareholders had the statutory right (now section 168 of the Companies Act 
2006) to remove any director from office and the right under the standard 
articles of association to decline to re-appoint a director retiring by rotation, 
but there was no evidence that the parties had given any thought at the time of 
incorporation to the existence of these powers.  Several years later, the parties 
fell out (without any obvious fault on either side) and the majority voted to 
remove the minority as a director.  The minority sought a winding-up order on 
the just and equitable basis. 
The House of Lords had no difficulty in attaching the label of a “quasi-
partnership” to this company and therefore importing equitable principles 
from the law of partnership. On the facts the shareholders were in substance 
partners: there was no evidence that the incorporation of the partnership 
business was understood by them to change the nature of their relationship   
The three classic characteristics of a quasi-partnership, and favouring the 
application of equitable principles, were listed by Lord Wilberforce as 
follows: 
 
“It would be impossible, and wholly undesirable, to define 
the circumstances in which these considerations may arise. 
Certainly the fact that a company is a small one, or a private 
company, is not enough. There are very many of these where 
the association is a purely commercial one, of which it can 
safely be said that the basis of association is adequately and 
exhaustively laid down in the articles. The superimposition 
of equitable considerations requires something more, which 
typically may include one, or probably more, of the 
following elements: (i) an association formed or continued on 
the basis of a personal relationship, involving mutual 
confidence - this element will often be found where a pre-
existing partnership has been converted into a limited 
company; (ii) an agreement, or understanding, that all, or 
63 See n 2 above. 
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some (for there may be "sleeping" members), of the 
shareholders shall participate in the conduct of the 
business; (iii) restriction upon the transfer of the members' 
interest in the company - so that if confidence is lost, or one 
member is removed from management, he cannot take out his 
stake and go elsewhere.”64  
 
Characteristic (ii) is the key element: (i) and (iii) will be much more 
common and not confined to cases of incorporated partnerships.   
Lord Wilberforce made further reference to the second characteristic, 
namely the understanding of management participation, later in his speech:65
 
“The just and equitable provision nevertheless comes to his 
assistance if he can point to, and prove, some special 
underlying obligation of his fellow member(s) in good faith, 
or confidence, that so long as the business continues he shall 
be entitled to management participation, an obligation so 
basic that, if broken, the conclusion must be that the 
association must be dissolved. And the principles on which 
he may do so are those worked out by the courts in 
partnership cases where there has been exclusion from 
management66  even where under the partnership agreement 
there is a power of expulsion.”67 
 
But it is at this point in his speech that difficulties arise in Lord 
Wilberforce’s analysis and doubts arise as to precisely what the case decides.  
Lord Wilberforce could have stopped at this stage in his analysis and held that 
the petitioner was entitled to a winding up on the just and equitable basis 
because the majority had broken a fundamental agreement that the minority 
should be entitled to be involved in the management.  The reasoning would go 
as follows: the partnership which had been converted into a company had 
been a partnership at will without any written partnership agreement; before 
the conversion each partner had the right of management participation; that 
right survived the conversion (and “trumped” the normal incident of 
incorporation that a director could be removed) because that reflected the 
substance of the parties’ relationship; the right of each party to terminate the 
relationship at will did not, however, survive the conversion, because that 
64 See n 2 above at 379. 
65 See n 2 above at 380. 
66 Citing Const v Harris [1824] Tur  & Rus 496, 525. 
67 Citing Blisset v Daniel [1853] 10 Hare 493; Lindley on Partnership, 13th ed (1971) 
pp 331, 595.  
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would be inconsistent with the new corporate structure. Without much doubt, 
this is how Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips68 understood the Westbourne 
Galleries69 case to have been decided, since otherwise it would not have fitted 
in with his analysis. 
However, Lord Wilberforce did not rest his judgment on this point.  As 
Lord Wilberforce had well in mind, partnership cases establish that a partner 
cannot be excluded from management participation unless it is otherwise 
agreed between the partners: see Lindley on Partnership,70 cited by Lord 
Wilberforce in the above passage in his speech. As Lord Wilberforce took 
pains to acknowledge because of the statutory right of removal of directors 
and the normal provisions in the articles for retirement of directors by 
rotation71 the case before him was one where the shareholders had agreed 
otherwise, ie had agreed that the majority could exclude the minority.  The 
crucial question was, according to Lord Wilberforce:  
 
“Did he [the petitioner] establish a case which, if he had 
remained in a partnership with a term providing for 
expulsion, would have justified an order for dissolution?” 
[emphasis added] 
 
Given the context, Lord Wilberforce must have been referring here to a 
general power of expulsion,72 as opposed to one only exercisable in the event 
of misconduct: such were the facts in Blisset v Daniel,73 upon which Lord 
Wilberforce founded his analysis. After posing the question, Lord Wilberforce 
quoted the findings of fact in the judgment at first instance and concluded: 
 
“Reading this in the context of the judgment as a whole, 
which had dealt with the specific complaints of one side 
against the other, I take it as a finding that the respondents 
were not entitled, in justice and equity, to make use of their 
legal powers of expulsion and that, in accordance with the 
principles of such cases as Blisset v Daniel,74 the only just 
and equitable course was to dissolve the association. To my 
68 See n 1 above. 
69 See n 2 above at 380G-H. 
70 See n 67 above at pp 331 and 594-595. 
71 See n 2 above at 380. 
72 Lord Cross in his speech assumed that an expulsion clause in partnership articles 
would be exercisable only in the case of misconduct ([1973] AC at p 386H), but this 
does not appear to have been Lord Wilberforce’s assumption. 
73 See n 3 above. 
74 See n 3 above. 
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mind, two factors strongly support this. First, Mr. Nazar 
made it perfectly clear that he did not regard Mr. 
Ebrahimi as a partner, but did regard him as an 
employee. But there was no possible doubt as to Mr. 
Ebrahimi's status throughout, so that Mr. Nazar's refusal 
to recognise it amounted, in effect, to a repudiation of the 
relationship. Secondly, Mr. Ebrahimi, through ceasing to be 
a director, lost his right to share in the profits through 
directors' remuneration, retaining only the chance of 
receiving dividends as a minority shareholder. It is true that 
an assurance was given in evidence that the previous practice 
(of not paying dividends) would not be continued, but the 
fact remains that Mr. Ebrahimi was thenceforth at the mercy 
of the Messrs. Nazar as to what he should receive out of the 
profits and when. He was, moreover, unable to dispose of his 
interest without the consent of the Nazars. All these matters 
lead only to the conclusion that the right course was to 
dissolve the association by winding up.”75  
 In a case where the partnership deed confers an express general power of 
expulsion of a partner, it is not the law that the exercise of that power will 
generally (absent misconduct) justify an order for the dissolution of the 
partnership.  Cases such as Const v Harris 76and Blisset v Daniel77 (the two 
cases referred to by Lord Wilberforce) are to the effect that, under traditional 
equitable principles, a power of expulsion, because it is expropriatory in 
nature without a corresponding duty to pay a fair value for the expelled 
partner’s share, must be exercised in good faith for the benefit of the 
partnership as a whole.78  
The facts in Blisset v Daniel79 are summarised on page 5 above.  The 
expelled partner commenced proceedings for reinstatement, alternatively for 
payment of the true value of his share of the partnership.  Page Wood V-C 
struck down the expulsion firstly on the ground that it was impossible in the 
circumstances to carry out the stipulated valuation of the expelled partner’s 
share. The Vice-Chancellor, however, went on to strike down the expulsion 
                                                     
75 See n 2 above at 381 C-E. 
76 See n 66 above. 
77 See n 3 above. 
78 See Lindley & Banks on Partnership 18th Edition (2002) at paragraphs 10-119 to 
10-125. 
79 See n 3 above. 
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on a second ground, namely that the majority had acted in bad faith.80  This 
bears a strong resemblance to the equitable doctrine of a fraud of the minority 
discussed above.81
So, a power of expulsion in a partnership agreement must be exercised in 
good faith for the benefit of the partnership as a whole. But, and here is the 
rub, Lord Wilberforce made it clear in the Westbourne Galleries82 case that it 
was not necessary for the minority to prove that the majority had acted in bad 
faith within this doctrine and it was on this very point that he disagreed with 
the Court of Appeal:  
 
“I must deal with one final point which was much relied on 
by the Court of Appeal. It was said that the removal was, 
according to the evidence of Mr Nazar, bona fide in the 
interests of the company; that Mr. Ebrahimi had not shown 
the contrary; that he ought to do so or to demonstrate that no 
reasonable man could think that his removal was in the 
company's interest. This formula "bona fide in the interests of 
the company" is one that is relevant in certain contexts of 
company law and I do not doubt that in many cases decisions 
have to be left to majorities or directors to take which the 
courts must assume had this basis. It may, on the other hand, 
become little more than an alibi for a refusal to consider the 
merits of the case, and in a situation such as this it seems to 
have little meaning other than "in the interests of the 
majority." Mr. Nazar may well have persuaded himself, quite 
genuinely, that the company would be better off without Mr. 
Ebrahimi, but if Mr. Ebrahimi disputed this, or thought the 
same with reference to Mr. Nazar, what prevails is simply the 
majority view. To confine the application of the just and 
equitable clause to proved cases of mala fides would be to 
negative the generality of the words. It is because I do not 
accept this that I feel myself obliged to differ from the Court 
of Appeal.”83  
 
                                                     
80 The facts of Blisset v Daniel bear a remarkable resemblance to the recent case of 
Mullins v Laughton [2003] Ch 250, even to the extent that the businesses in both 
cases were based in Bristol. In Mullins v Laughton a partnership was dissolved by the 
court in circumstances where the partners had acted in bad faith in exercising a power 
of expulsion. 
81 See above at pages 8-10. 
82 See n 2 above. 
83 See n 2 above at page 381 F-H. 
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There is an echo in this passage of a main theme in Lord Wilberforce’s 
speech that the court should give full effect to the generality of the statutory 
words: see the following sentence in the earlier passage in his speech cited on 
page 13 above:  
 
“The foundation of it all lies in the words "just and equitable" 
and, if there is any respect in which some of the cases may be 
open to criticism, it is that the courts may sometimes have 
been too timorous in giving them full force.” 
It is not easy to reconcile Lord Wilberforce’s apparent finding that the 
majority had acted in bad faith in accordance with Blisset v Daniel 
principles84 with his later statement that the majority may well have acted in 
good faith in the interests of the company.85  It may be theoretically possible 
that partners can at the same time act in good faith in the interests of the 
partnership and with bad faith towards the expelled partner (eg because they 
does not even recognise him as a partner).  However, it is a reasonable 
assumption that Lord Wilberforce was not intending to reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeal on the narrow basis of a factual finding that the majority 
had failed to recognise the minority as a quasi-partner.  The case has not been 
understood as turning on any such finding – if it had been so understood, then 
the conventional wisdom would be that, in expulsion cases, the minority has 
to show that the majority acted in breach of the duties of good faith that a 
partner owes to his co-partners.  The only fair conclusion is that Lord 
Wilberforce was saying that the just and equitable remedy enabled the court to 
grant relief in circumstances going beyond established equitable principles. It 
is clear that Lord Wilberforce was going significantly beyond what was 
actually decided in the Wondoflex case.86  In that case Smith J said that it 
would have been a “question of some difficulty” to determine whether a 
winding up order should be made if the majority had acted in good faith.  He 
granted a winding up order because he found as a fact that the majority had 
acted in bad faith.   
Whereas Lord Wilberforce used Blisset v Daniel87 as authority for the 
proposition that a power of expulsion must be exercised in good faith and not 
for any selfish motive, in O’Neill v Phillips88 Lord Hoffmann, whilst 
acknowledging that fact, cited it as authority for a different and novel 
purpose: 
84 See n 3 above at 381 C. 
85 See n 3 above at 381 G-H. 
86 See n 51 above. 
87 See n 3 above. 
88 See n 1 above. 
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“An example of such equitable principles in action [upon 
which the court decides that the conduct is unjust, inequitable 
or unfair for the purposes of the statutory remedies] is Blisset 
v Daniel89 (1853) 10 Hare 493 to which Lord Wilberforce 
referred in In re Westbourne Galleries Ltd.90 Page Wood V-
C held that upon the true construction of the articles, two-
thirds of the partners could expel a partner by serving a 
notice upon him without holding any meeting or giving any 
reason. But he held that the power must be exercised in good 
faith. He said,91 that "the literal construction of these articles 
cannot be enforced" and, after citing from the title "De 
Societate" in Justinian's Institutes, went on, at pp 523-425:  
 
"It must be plain, that you can neither exercise a power of 
this description by dissolving the partnership, nor do any 
other act for purposes contrary to the plain general 
meaning of the deed, which must be this - that this power 
is inserted, not for the benefit of any particular parties 
holding two-thirds of the shares, but for the benefit of the 
whole society and partnership . . ."  
 
………..[T]here is more than one theoretical basis upon 
which a decision like Blisset v Daniel92 can be explained. 
Nineteenth century England law, with its division 
between law and equity, traditionally took the view that 
while literal meanings might prevail in a court of law, 
equity could give effect to what it considered to have been 
the true intentions of the parties by preventing or 
restraining the exercise of legal rights. So Smith J93  
speaks of the exercise of the power being valid "in law" but 
its exercise not being just and equitable because contrary to 
the contemplation of the parties. This way of looking at the 
matter is a product of English legal history which has 
survived the amalgamation of the courts of law and equity. 
But another approach, in a different legal culture, might be 
simply to take a less literal view of "legal" construction and 
89 See n 3 above. 
90 See n 2 above at 381. 
91 See n 3 above at 523. 
92 See n 3 above. 
93 In the Wondoflex case see n 51 above. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
25  
                                                     
interpret the article themselves in accordance with what Page 
Wood V-C called “the plain general meaning of the deed.” 
Or one might, as in Continental systems, achieve the same 
result by introducing a general requirement of good faith into 
contractual performance. These are all different ways of 
doing the same thing. I do not suggest there is any advantage 
in abandoning the traditional English theory, even though it 
is derived from arrangements for the administration of justice 
which were abandoned over a century ago. On the contrary, a 
new and unfamiliar approach could only cause uncertainty. 
So I agree with Jonathan Parker J when he said in In re Astec 
(BSR) plc:94  
 
“in order to give rise to an equitable constraint based on 
‘legitimate expectation’ what is required is a personal 
relationship or personal dealings of some kind between the 
party seeking to exercise the legal right and the party seeking 
to restrain such exercise, such as will affect the conscience of 
the former.”  
 
This is putting the matter in very traditional language, 
reflecting in the word "conscience" the ecclesiastical origins 
of the long-departed Court of Chancery. As I have said, I 




The analysis of Lord Wilberforce in the Westbourne Galleries95 case is 
not wholly consistent with the analysis of Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v 
Phillips.96  Lord Hoffmann identified the true basis of the decision in the 
former case as being that (a) it was right to apply equitable principles 
borrowed from the law of partnership insofar as they were compatible with 
the new and permanent corporate structure, and (b) there had been a breach of 
the minority’s fundamental right, recognised under the law of partnership and 
not expressly excluded by the parties, to management participation.  Lord 
Hoffmann held that this analysis, ie the application by analogy of traditional 
equitable principles, provided the answer to the facts of the case before him.  
However, it does not necessarily follow that he meant that established 
94 In re Astec (BSR) plc94 [1998] 2 BCLC 556, 588. 
95 See n 2 above. 
96 See n 1 above. 
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equitable principles provided the answers in all cases, although this is not a 
point made in any subsequent case: see eg the recent statement of general 
principle by the Court of Appeal in Grace v Biagioli.97
It is apparent from the passage in the speech of Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill 
v Phillips98 that he was conscious of the difficulties of a “one theory fitting all 
cases” solution.  He nevertheless suggested obiter, with the citation of 
virtually no authority, that other cases fell within his “bargain” analysis.  He 
said this: 
 
“I do not suggest that exercising rights in breach of some 
promise or undertaking is the only form of conduct which 
will be regarded as unfair for the purposes of section 459. For 
example, there may be some event which puts an end to the 
basis upon which the parties entered into association with 
each other, making it unfair that one shareholder should insist 
upon the continuance of the association. The analogy of 
contractual frustration suggests itself. The unfairness may 
arise not from what the parties have positively agreed but 
from a majority using its legal powers to maintain the 
association in circumstances to which the minority can 
reasonably say it did not agree: non haec in foedera veni. It is 
well recognised that in such a case there would be power to 
wind up the company on the just and equitable ground (see 
Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltd)99   and it seems to me that, in the 
absence of a winding up, it could equally be said to come 
within section 459. But this form of unfairness is also based 
upon established equitable principles and it does not arise in 
this case.”100  
The principles enunciated in Lord Hoffmann’s speech (ie the bargain 
between shareholders subject to established equitable exceptions) should not, 
however, be taken as the answer to all cases, for a number of reasons: 
 
(a) That cannot have been Lord Hoffmann’s intention because 
otherwise his principles would suffer from an internal inconsistency. 
 
                                                     
97 Grace v Biagioli [2006] 2 BCLC 70, 92. 
98 See n 1 above at 1101E-H. 
99 Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltd [1990] BCLC 342. 
100 See n 1 at 1101-1102. 
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(b) Contrary to a main theme of Lord Wilberforce’s speech in the 
Westbourne Galleries case,101 those principles fail to give “full 
effect” to the generality of the statutory words and amount to judicial 
legislation. 
 
(c) It is not easy to discern the settled or traditional equitable 
principles that Lord Hoffmann was referring to. 
 
(d) As appears from the passage in his speech at page 1101F cited on 
pages 16-17 above,102 Lord Hoffmann himself was conscious that he 
was not legislating for all cases.     
So far as (a) and (b) are concerned, on the one hand Lord Hoffmann held 
that resort could only be had to “settled” or “traditional” equitable principles.  
On the other hand he also said in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc103 in the 
passage cited below that Parliament’s intention in enacting the unfair 
prejudice remedy had been to free the courts from the limitation of having to 
find that the case fell within the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle.104 
But those exceptions are based on the doctrine of “fraud on the minority”, an 
equitable doctrine par excellence. 
 
“The answer to this question often turns on the fact that the 
powers which the shareholders have entrusted to the board 
are fiduciary powers, which must be exercised for the benefit 
of the company as a whole. If the board act for some ulterior 
purpose, they step outside the terms of the bargain between 
the shareholders and the company. As a matter of ordinary 
company law, this may or may not entitle the individual 
shareholder to a remedy. It depends upon whether he can 
bring himself within one of the exceptions to the rule in Foss 
v Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461. But the fact that the board are 
protected by the principle of majority rule does not 
necessarily prevent their conduct from being unfair within 
the meaning of s 459. Enabling the court in an appropriate 
case to outflank the rule in Foss v Harbottle was one of the 
purposes of the section. So in Re a Company (No 00370 of 
1987), ex p Glossop [1988] BCLC 570, [1988] 1 WLR 1068, 
where the complaint was of a consistent refusal by the board 
                                                     
101 See n 2 above. 
102 See n 1 at 1101 F. 
103 See n 44 above. 
104 See n 6 above. 
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to recommend payment of a dividend, Harman J said that 
such conduct could make it just and equitable to wind up the 
company. He did so by reference to the seminal judgment of 
Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum 
Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 1126, [1974] AC 821 on the principles 
by which the court decides whether the board has acted 
within its fiduciary powers and said that on the facts alleged 
it was arguable that the board had exceeded them. This seems 
to me in principle the correct point at which to start the 
inquiry into both whether the conduct in question could 
justify a just and equitable winding up and also whether it is 
unfair for the purposes of s 459. It seems clear that but for a 
technical objection which was removed when the section was 
amended in 1989, Harman J would have allowed the petition 
to proceed on both grounds, as Peter Gibson J did before the 
amendment in Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd [1990] BCLC 80, 
[1990] Ch 682. I should however add that while I 
respectfully think that Harman J was right in asking himself 
whether the board had abused its fiduciary powers, I would 
not necessarily subscribe to the theory of corporate hubris on 
which he decided that it arguably had.  Although one begins 
with the articles and the powers of the board, a finding that 
conduct was not in accordance with the articles does not 
necessarily mean that it was unfair, still less that the court 
will exercise its discretion to grant relief. There is often 
sound sense in the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 
461. In choosing the term 'unfairly prejudicial', the Jenkins 
Committee (para 204) equated it with Lord Cooper's 
understanding of 'oppression' in Elder v Elder and Watson 
1952 SC 49:  
 
‘a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a 
violation of the conditions of fair play on which every 
shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled 
to rely.’ 
 
So trivial or technical infringements of the articles were not 
intended to give rise to petitions under s 459.” 
Thus, it may be doubted whether, if the purpose of the statutory remedy 
was to outflank a settled equitable doctrine, it was also Parliament’s intention 
that in all other respects settled equitable principles should reign supreme.  
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Lord Wilberforce did not himself believe that he was applying traditional 
equitable principles in the Westbourne Galleries105 case – on the contrary, he 
went beyond such principles.  Even if that case is analysed in the way 
suggested on page 25 above, it is very difficult to see how such an analysis is 
based on traditional equitable principles.  In any event, since the analysis is 
that of the application of equitable principles by analogy, the argument in 
favour of sticking to the settled equitable principles (developed ex hypothesi 
in a different context) is fundamentally weakened. 
So far as (c) is concerned, Lord Hoffman must have had in mind in the 
passage cited on p 26 above the line of authority to the effect that a court will 
wind up a company on the just and equitable basis where the whole 
substratum of the company has gone. But this ground for winding up is a 
narrow one: Re Perfectair Holdings Ltd.106 Lord Hoffmann referred in 
O’Neill v Phillips,107 as an example of a settled equitable principle, to the 
happening of “some event which puts an end to the basis upon which the 
parties entered into association with each other, making it unfair that one 
shareholder should insist upon the continuance of the association”, but that 
formulation, divorced from settled equitable principles, comes close to 
returning to a test of mere unfairness.  Indeed, in the recent case of Re 
Metropolis Motorcycles Ltd,108 Mann J came close to applying that 
formulation as one merely of fairness – it was not suggested before him that 
he was guided by any earlier authority. 
As to the factual situations in other cases of alleged minority oppression, 
Lord Hoffmann did not disapprove of the result in any previous decided case 
on the statutory remedies and he did not seek to explain how any such case 
(other than the Westbourne Galleries case)109 could be fitted within his 
analysis.   
One recent example of the difficulties that would arise if Lord 
Hoffmann’s analysis were to be taken as applicable to all cases may be cited.  
It concerned the common allegation of minority oppression that the majority 
favour themselves by paying themselves excessive remuneration and paying 
inadequate dividends to shareholders: a remote example of exclusion of the 
minority.  Such had been the allegation in two of the cases cited by Lord 
Hoffmann in the passage in his judgment in Re Saul D Harrison & Son plc110 
cited above and explained there as cases of breach of fiduciary duty. Under 
Lord Hoffmann’s principles, the petitioner had to establish that the directors 
105 See n 2 above. 
106 [1990] BCLC 423. 
107 See n 1 above. 
108 Re Metropolis Motorcycles Ltd [2006] EWHC 364 (Ch). 
109 See n 2 above. 
110 See n 44 above. 
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had acted in breach of their fiduciary duties, which in most cases will require 
proof of bad faith on the part of the directors.  However, prior to O’Neill v 
Phillips111 it had never been held that bad faith or breach of fiduciary duty 
needed to be shown.  The prevailing view was that expressed by Sir Richard 
Scott V-C (as he then was) in Re A Company,112 to the effect that the relevant 
standard, against which the fairness of the majority’s conduct was to be 
judged, was “objective commercial criteria” of the proper level of 
remuneration.  In the recent case of Re Campbell Irvine (Holdings) Ltd,113 
Blackburne J applied the test of “objective commercial criteria” rather than 




It is submitted: 
 
(i) The test of the “bargain” between shareholders, as 
supplemented by traditional equitable principles, which 
was enunciated by Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v 
Phillips,114 is sufficient to decide many cases of minority 
oppression, particularly those where a minority claims 
that the majority have broken a promise. 
 
(ii) That test was not intended and should not be taken as 
governing every case and factual circumstance.  It may 
be the starting point of the analysis in a given case, but it 
is to be considered in the light of other lines of authority 
in factual contexts closer to the case in point than that in 
O’Neill v Phillips.115  It is always worth remembering 
Lord Upjohn’s wise words in Phipps v Boardman: 
 
“Rules of equity have to be applied to such a great diversity 
of circumstances that they can be stated only in the most 
general terms and applied with particular attention to the 
exact circumstances of each case.”116 
 
111 See n 1 above. 
112 Re A Company (No. 004415 of 1996) [1997] 1 BCLC 479. 
113 Re Campbell Irvine (Holdings) Ltd [2006] EWHC 406 (Ch). 
114 See n 1 above. 
115 See n 1 above. 
116 Phipps v Boardman [1967] 2 AC 46, at 123. 
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(iii) There is an inconsistency between the reasoning of Lord 
Wilberforce in Westbourne Galleries117 case and that of 
Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips,118 which can only 
be resolved by the House of Lords.  One is left with the 
strong suspicion that, had the earlier case come before 
Lord Hoffmann rather than Lord Wilberforce, he would 
have dismissed the appeal and approved the reasoning of 
the very strong Court of Appeal below,119 on the basis 
that there was no unconscionability on the part of the 
majority under traditional equitable principles.  In that 
event, the rights of minority shareholders would have 
been even narrower than they are now. 
 
Where does this leave the “conventional wisdom” discussed on pages 10 – 
12 above, ie the grounds upon which a court will grant relief in the case of a 
breakdown of relations in a quasi-partnership?  It is submitted that there is no 
over-arching general test applicable to all cases of unfair prejudice. The 
search for any holy grail, be it a “middle way” or an extremer version, is 
pointless.  Just as the courts adopt an incremental, case-by-case, common-
sense and practical approach in common-law negligence cases, so it is 
submitted they should adopt a similar approach in unfair prejudice cases.  The 
“conventional wisdom” can be seen to strike a fair balance in a commercial 
context between competing interests and therefore is to be commended.   That 
“fair balance” of competing interests is to be looked for in other factual 
contexts where a minority shareholder claims to have been oppressed. 
117 See n 2 above. 
118 See n 1 above. 
119 [1971] Ch 799. 
